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TURNING FEDERALISM RIGHT-SIDE UP 
THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION. By Michael 
Greve.1 Harvard University Press. 2012. 528 pp. Cloth, 
$39.95. 
Ilya Somin2 
INTRODUCTION 
Michael Greve’s The Upside-Down Constitution is one of 
the most important works on constitutional federalism in years. 
It is the best exposition to date of the idea that the American 
Constitution establishes a federal system primarily devoted to 
promoting competition between state governments. It is also 
probably the most comprehensive critique of the traditional view 
that federalism is really about promoting the interests of state 
governments. As Greve recognizes, state governments rarely 
want to compete, often preferring to establish cartels among 
themselves (pp. 8–9, 189–94). 
Much previous scholarship has explored the advantages of 
interstate competition,3 and the idea that the enforcement of fe-
 
 1. John G. Searle Scholar, America Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; 
Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. 
 2. Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. For helpful sugges-
tions and comments, I would like to thank Michael Greve, David Schleicher, and partici-
pants in the Cato Institute conference on Professor Greve’s book. The editors of Consti-
tutional Commentary invited me to write this review before Professor Greve accepted a 
position at George Mason University School of Law in May 2012. I developed the main 
points presented in this review before that event, as well. 
 3. See, e.g., LARRY RIBSTEIN & ERIN O’HARA, THE LAW MARKET (2009), 
GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX 173–86 (1980); 
ALBERT BRETON, COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTS (1996); ALBERT BRETON & ANTHONY 
SCOTT, THE DESIGN OF FEDERATIONS 13–19 (1980); THOMAS DYE, FEDERALISM: 
COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990); WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL 
FEDERALISM (1972); James M. Buchanan, Federalism as an Ideal Political Order and an 
Objective for Constitutional Reform, 21 PUBLIUS 19 (1995); Michael McConnell, Federal-
ism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1497–1500 (1987); Wal-
lace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, 1134–37 
(1999); Wallace E. Oates & Robert Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: 
Efficiency Enhancing or Efficiency Distorting? 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988); Ilya Somin, 
Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design, 28 SOCIAL PHIL. & POL’Y 
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deralism cannot be equated with promoting the interests of state 
governments. 4 But Greve’s book is by far the best and most 
comprehensive application of these ideas to constitutional inter-
pretation. 
Greve praises the original Constitution for creating an effec-
tive system of interstate competition (chs. 2–3) and the nine-
teenth and early twentieth century Supreme Court for enforcing 
it (chs. 4–7). But he warns that the system has broken down over 
the last eighty years, replacing competition with cartels and what 
he considers to be dysfunctional empowerment of state govern-
ments (chs. 8–11). He argues that American federalism has now 
reached a crisis point from which we must either restore some of 
its earlier, more competitive, structure, or face a decline similar 
to those that have beset several other federal systems (pp. 279–
80, 380–97). 
The post-New Deal “inversion” of priorities, from maintain-
ing interstate competition to fostering cartels and cooperation, is 
what gives the book its provocative title. To turn the Constitu-
tion right side up, Greve contends, we will have to rediscover the 
virtues of competition. 
In Part I, I describe Greve’s argument, focusing especially 
on the ways in which it enhances our understanding of the histo-
ry of constitutional federalism. Part II addresses a potential in-
ternal contradiction in Greve’s position. While he emphasizes 
the need for the judiciary to enforce a competitive regime and 
recognizes that the federal government often has incentives to 
promote cartelization (pp. 8–9, 192–93), he endorses a broad in-
terpretation of congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause and the Spending Clause which effectively gives Congress 
a blank check to suppress competition in some of the ways he 
deplores (pp. 162–65, 250–58, 343–46). 
Part III briefly considers a second tension in Greve’s analy-
sis. Greve pins his hopes on originalism as the best possible way 
to restore a competitive federalist Constitution (pp. 394–96), 
 
202 (2011); Barry Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-
Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995); 
Ralph K. Winter, Private Goals and Competition Among State Legal Systems, 6 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 127 (1982). For an early forerunner of this literature, see F.A. Hayek, 
The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, 5 NEW COMMONWEALTH Q. 131 
(1939). 
 4. See, e.g., John McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense 
of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89 (2004); Ilya Somin, Closing 
the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to 
State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461 (2002); Weingast, supra note 3. 
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though he suggests that it should be an originalism that views the 
Constitution as an integrated whole, rather than narrowly 
“clause-bound” (p. 393). While he argues that the original Con-
stitution establishes a competitive structure (ch. 3), he also re-
cognizes that the Founders paid little attention to interstate mo-
bility and competition (pp. 56–61). These two positions are not 
completely irreconcilable. But they are more difficult to square 
than Greve sometimes allows. 
I. A COMPETITIVE CONSTITUTION 
A. THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION 
Greve’s central argument is that “the commitment to com-
petitiveness is hardwired into our Constitution’s structure” (p. 
389), indeed that “[t]he United States has the single most pro-
competitive constitution in the world” (p. 330). In a fascinating 
discussion of the original 1787 Constitution, Greve shows how 
various seemingly disparate provisions came together to force 
states to compete with each other for people and businesses, and 
limited their ability to establish anticompetitive trade barriers 
and otherwise interfere with interstate commerce (ch. 3). 
For example, the Privileges and Immunities Clause requires 
states to treat migrants from other states on par with their own 
citizens, thereby facilitating interstate mobility (pp. 64, 69).5 The 
Compact Clause forbids states to make compacts among them-
selves without congressional consent, thereby preventing them 
from forming anticompetitive cartels (p. 69).6 The Commerce 
Clause, of course, prevents states from setting up trade barriers 
(p. 64).7 Article I, § 10 of the Constitution bars the states from 
laying imposts and duties on exports and imports, and from es-
tablishing duties on tonnage. This prevents states from taxing the 
commerce of other states, and forces them to engage in tax com-
petition in order to raise revenue (pp. 81–82). Greve effectively 
explains how many other parts of the original Constitution facili-
tate “horizontal competition” between state governments, as 
well (ch. 3). For example, the Contract Clause forbidding state 
impairment of the obligation of contracts, prevents state govern-
ments from reneging on contractual obligations to out-of-staters 
or authorizing their citizens to do so. 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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In addition to enumerating the ways in which various parts 
of the original Constitution promote competition, he also sug-
gests that the Constitution cannot readily be interpreted as pro-
moting some other, noncompetitive, objective of federalism. Un-
like John C. Calhoun and others who saw inherent value in state 
sovereignty,8 Greve contends that the leading Founders viewed 
states as “mere instruments” (p. 50). This is shown by the wil-
lingness of James Madison and Alexander Hamilton to advocate 
the complete abolition of state governments in the debates over 
the Constitution, and the desire of the former to establish a fed-
eral “negative” over state laws (pp. 45–50, 56–57). He also re-
jects the idea, commonly used to justify many federal systems 
outside the United States,9 that American federalism can be seen 
as a way of reconciling opposing ethnic, religious, or political 
identities by giving minority groups a degree of autonomy at the 
state level (p. 49).10 
Greve is probably correct to argue that this idea was not 
much considered by the Founding Fathers. In Federalist 2, John 
Jay even (somewhat inaccurately) claimed that one of the advan-
tages enjoyed by the United States is that Americans are “one 
united people; a people descended from the same ancestors, 
speaking the same language, [and] professing the same reli-
gion.”11 
More controversially, Greve rejects the traditional view that 
one major purpose of American federalism is to enable the 
states to resist federal usurpations and threats to liberty (pp. 52–
53). He dismisses the significance of Madison’s famous state-
ment in Federalist 51 that the existence of rival state and federal 
governments creates a “double security” for “the rights of the 
people” because the different levels of government will “control 
 
 8. See, e.g., John C. Calhoun, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of 
the United States, in CALHOUN, UNION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF 
JOHN C. CALHOUN 194–96 (Ross M. Lence ed., Liberty Fund Books 1990) (describing 
the Constitution as a creation of states that retain inherent rights of “sovereignty”). 
 9. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 601–28 (rev. 
ed., 2001) (describing ways in which federal systems can be used to alleviate ethnic con-
flict). 
 10. For a recent argument that this theory has greater applicability to the American 
case than Greve and others suppose, see Heather Gerken, A New Progressive Federal-
ism, DEMOCRACY (Spring 2012), available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/24/ 
a_new_progressive_federalism.pdf. In a forthcoming article, I contend that American 
federalism has historically benefitted minority groups more and harmed them less than 
longstanding conventional wisdom supposes. See Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism 
and Political Freedom, NOMOS (forthcoming) (Symposium on Federalism and Subsi-
diarity). 
 11. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay). 
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each other,” even as separation of powers within each level en-
sures that “each will be controled [sic] by itself.”12 Greve is skep-
tical that this idea was really significant to Madison’s thinking 
because, elsewhere in the Federalist, Madison details a variety of 
abuses by state governments, which indicates his belief that they 
were “out of control” and a threat to liberty themselves (p. 53). 
Greve argues that Madison’s vision implies that “state resistance 
to federal assertions of power will typically materialize in de-
fense of factional schemes” rather than “the rights of the 
people” (p. 53). However, there is no necessary inconsistency in 
simultaneously believing that state governments are threats to 
liberty in their own right and that they will nonetheless act to 
constrain federal threats to liberty. The latter could threaten the 
prerogatives of the states themselves or the “factional schemes” 
of the state government’s political supporters. As Madison fa-
mously suggested in Federalist 51,13 state governments might de-
fend liberty against federal encroachment out of self-interest ra-
ther than high-minded principle. 
Greve is probably wrong to suggest that competition is the 
near-exclusive purpose of American federalism.14 But he makes 
a strong case that the original Constitution is at least compatible 
with a competitive vision, and promotes it in many ways. 
B. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM  
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
In one of the strongest and most original parts of the book, 
Greve gives a fascinating discussion of how the Constitution’s 
competitive structure was promoted and enforced by the federal 
judiciary from the early republic through the early twentieth 
century. 
Interestingly, Greve contends that the judiciary, not Con-
gress, was the main vehicle for promoting interstate competition. 
He goes so far as to say that the enforcement of the Constitu-
tion’s “procompetitive rules and arrangements [was] supplied 
almost exclusively by the federal judiciary,” while congressional 
activity in this field was “sporadic” at best (pp. 88–89). Such 
“judicial dominance” was viable, Greve contends, because the 
 
 12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 13. See id. (“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the 
man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.”). 
 14. Greve does acknowledge that Madison might have envisioned state govern-
ments as a potential check on extreme abuses of federal power, which they might resist 
by force of arms (pp. 54–55). 
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sectional antagonisms of nineteenth century America—which 
arose from conflicts over slavery, the tariff, and other issues—
prevented the states from uniting to curb the judges’ power (pp. 
89–91). 
It would be impossible in a review to fully document the 
richness and insight of Greve’s analysis of this period (chs. 4–7). 
But among the most noteworthy parts are his analysis of the juri-
sprudence of the Dormant Commerce Clause (ch. 4), his discus-
sion of the ways in which the courts used the Fourteenth 
Amendment to protect interstate trade conducted by corpora-
tions (pp. 112–32), and his discussion of the role of federal com-
mon law in protecting commercial enterprises against exploita-
tion by state courts (pp. 133–52). 
Greve’s analysis of the issue of the status of corporations in 
nineteenth century constitutional law is particularly fascinating, 
addressing an issue little-noticed by modern constitutional law 
scholars. As he points out, there was considerable uncertainty in 
the nineteenth century over whether corporate entities had 
standing to sue under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, which required states to treat citizens of other states 
equally with their own (pp. 112–15). An 1809 Supreme Court de-
cision held that corporations, because they are not “citizens,” 
may not “sue and be sued in the courts of the United States un-
less the rights of the members, in this respect, can be exercised in 
their corporate name.”15 As a result of this ambiguous ruling and 
other similar cases, it was not clear whether corporate entities 
could assert constitutional rights under the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause (pp. 113–19). This ambiguity left open the pos-
sibility that states could discriminate against out-of-state busi-
nesses organized as corporations in favor of in-staters. The 
nineteenth century Supreme Court eventually ended up combat-
ing such discriminatory legislation under the Dormant Com-
merce Clause (pp. 123–27), whose protections—unlike those of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause—were not limited to citi-
zens. Greve persuasively argues that the Court’s efforts to con-
strain state protectionism played a valuable role in facilitating 
the rise of interstate trade, especially that conducted by large 
corporate enterprises (pp. 126–28). If he is right, the Supreme 
Court deserves more credit than it usually receives for the im-
pressive economic growth of the United States in the late nine-
teenth century. 
 
 15. Bank of the United States v. Devaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809).  
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Greve sees the Dormant Commerce Clause as central to the 
operation of American federalism in the nineteenth century, 
pointing out that several of the Court’s most important constitu-
tional decisions of that era involved efforts to combat state pro-
tectionism. Gibbons v. Ogden,16 the Court’s most significant ear-
ly Commerce Clause case, involved a state effort to create a 
steamboat monopoly on an important interstate shipping route 
between New York and New Jersey (pp. 96–98). Both Gibbons 
and later nineteenth century decisions, Greve argues, played an 
important role in constraining state government favoritism to-
wards in-state businesses at the expense of outsiders (pp. 101–
11). Greve notes that the nineteenth century Court’s objective 
was less to promote state competition as such, but to ensure eco-
nomic “union” (p. 111). But, as he explains, promoting union by 
restricting state protectionism also had the effect of promoting 
interstate economic competition (p. 111). States unable to pro-
tect their firms against out-of-state competition must instead 
promote policies that are conducive to attracting investment and 
fostering economic growth, if they want to benefit in-state busi-
nesses and develop a healthy tax base. 
Regarding federal common law, Greve interestingly sees the 
federal common law system established by the Court’s famous 
decision in Swift v. Tyson as a tool for protecting interstate 
commerce against state courts seeking to victimize out-of-
staters.17 Greve argues that out-of-state firms should not be re-
quired to litigate “diversity” cases under state common law be-
cause not only the state forum, but the state substantive law 
could be biased against them (pp. 134–37). For this reason, he 
contends, Swift’s requirement that federal courts apply a unified 
federal common law in diversity cases was a necessary response 
to the danger of state favoritism and towards their own firms. It 
was particularly important in the case of industries such as rai-
lroads and maritime shippers, which had to span many states in 
order to operate efficiently (pp. 149–51). 
Finally, Greve points out that nineteenth century views of 
the Spending Clause took a relatively restrictive view of the 
power of Congress to grant subsidies to state governments, and 
Congress in fact granted few such subsidies for local projects (ch. 
7).18 The push for the states to largely subsist on their own fiscal 
 
 16. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 17. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 18. Greve does point out some inconsistencies in the views of nineteenth century 
presidents such as Jefferson, Madison, and Andrew Jackson, who claimed to take a nar-
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resources stimulated interstate competition for business and tax-
payers, and also incentivized state policies that promote eco-
nomic growth (pp. 167-69).19 
Perhaps the biggest merit of this part of the book is Greve’s 
successful integration of these seemingly disparate nineteenth 
century doctrines into a unified framework of competitive fede-
ralism. Although the nineteenth century Supreme Court did not 
always intend to do so, Greve argues that it deserves credit for 
fostering competitive federalism through a combination of sev-
eral different doctrines.  
At the same time, Greve recognizes that nineteenth century 
competitive federalism was not simply a result of legal doctrine 
divorced from politics. The Court’s ability to enforce these pro-
competitive rules depended on a political system characterized 
by deep sectional conflict in the antebellum period. Later on it 
relied on the support of the then-dominant Republican Party, 
which favored internal free trade, even as it also promoted tariffs 
against foreign goods (pp. 171–74). This favorable political envi-
ronment for competitive federalism “could not and did not last” 
(p. 177). It began to deteriorate in the early twentieth century, 
and largely collapsed during the constitutional revolution of the 
New Deal period. 
C. THE DECLINE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM SINCE THE 
NEW DEAL 
The idea that American constitutional federalism under-
went a profound transition in the 1930s is hardly a new one. 
Scholars have long argued that the constitutional revolution of 
that period led to a major increase in federal government power, 
especially over the economy.20 Leading Supreme Court decisions 
of that era removed previous restraints on congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause and Spending Clause, enabling 
Congress to regulate almost any economic transaction and spend 
 
row view of the spending power, but also approved local pork-barrel projects at various 
times (pp. 164–67). 
 19. On the importance of “hard budget” constraints for competitive federalism, see, 
e.g., JONATHAN RODDEN, HAMILTON’S PARADOX: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF FISCAL 
FEDERALISM ch. 4 (2006); McGinnis & Somin, supra note 4; Weingast, supra note 3. 
 20. For a good statement of the conventional view, see, e.g., WILLIAM 
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN (1995). But see BARRY CUSHMAN, 
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998) (arguing that many of the New Deal inno-
vations in federalism doctrine were already present in previous cases, though even 
Cushman recognizes that a major change occurred). 
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money for virtually any purpose.21 Greve agrees that an impor-
tant transformation occurred, but argues that it empowered the 
states more than Washington (chs. 8–9).22 Greve describes the 
result as a “constitutional inversion” (pp. 181–83) under which 
states were now free to restrict competition and form cartels—
exactly the sort of behavior that the pre-New Deal Supreme 
Court had sought to constrain. 
In the fiscal arena, Greve points out that an incredible se-
venty-five percent of the increase in nonmilitary federal spend-
ing between 1932 and 1940 consisted of federal grants to state 
governments, which increased almost twenty-fold in all (p. 183). 
Moreover, a high proportion of these new grants worked in ways 
that undermined state incentives to compete with each other for 
taxpayers, for example by making state taxes deductible from 
federal taxes (thereby diminishing incentives for tax competi-
tion), and by enabling states to spend money on a variety of 
projects without having to raise it from their own tax revenue 
(pp. 250–57). 
Many of the New Deal economic regulations upheld under 
the new, far more expansive Commerce Clause interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause also upheld cartel-like regulations (pp. 
206–08). For example, the wheat production restrictions en-
dorsed by the Supreme Court in Wickard v. Filburn were meant 
to keep up the price of wheat by preventing producers in one 
state from undercutting those in others. As Greve points out, 
state governments often supported these schemes because they 
themselves preferred federally enforced cartels to competition—
much like competitors in many other markets (pp. 189–94). 
Greve also emphasizes the lesser known fact that, during this pe-
riod, the Supreme Court loosened Dormant Commerce Clause 
restrictions on state laws that curtail the movement of out-of-
state goods (pp. 214–20). This development reinforces Greve’s 
argument that the New Deal empowered states rather than con-
strained them. 
Greve notes that much of the new federal regulation and 
spending was justified by the alleged need to curb “races to the 
 
 21. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (expanding New Deal-era 
commerce power to its broadest extent); Seward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 
(1937) (embracing a very broad view of Congress’ power to spend money under the 
General Welfare Clause).  
 22. For an important previous argument along similar lines, see Stephen Gardbaum, 
New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483 
(1997). 
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bottom,” in which states would otherwise engage in destructive 
competition (p. 186). The paradigmatic example of such a pre-
New Deal “externality” was the Supreme Court’s 1918 decision 
in Hammer v. Dagenhart,23 which struck down a federal law ban-
ning child labor. Greve points out that virtually all states had 
adopted their own child labor laws by the time Hammer was 
overruled, and industrial child labor had nearly disappeared by 
1930 (pp. 187–88). The “race to the bottom” threat was greatly 
overblown. By contrast, New Deal constitutionalism enabled 
states to impose “actual externalities” on their neighbors by 
“tax[ing] and regulating . . . interstate commerce” and by facili-
tating the formation of cartels (p. 188). 
Finally, Greve provides a long and detailed critique of the 
Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins,24 which reversed Swift v. Tyson and required federal courts 
to apply state common law rather than federal common law in 
most diversity cases (ch. 10). Greve contends that Erie allowed 
states to use their common law to discriminate against out-of-
state producers and prey on interstate commerce for the benefit 
of in-state interest groups (ch. 10). 
While his argument likely has some validity, it is difficult to 
fully embrace it. At the very least, competitive pressure of the 
kind he praises elsewhere in the book should impose constraints 
on state governments whose common law doctrines go too far. 
Businesses will be reluctant to locate in such states or sell their 
products there. In recent years, such pressures have forced a 
number of states to enact tort reform laws, including such pre-
viously infamous “tort hellholes” as Alabama and Mississippi.25 
Be that as it may, Erie reinforces Greve’s more general thesis 
that the New Deal revolution empowered the states. 
Greve’s theory that the New Deal constitutional revolution 
empowered the states more than it restricted them is both in-
sightful and largely accurate. He is, however, perhaps too quick 
to reject the idea that it also promoted the centralization of 
power in the hands of the federal government (pp. 182–83). Such 
 
 23. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 25. See Ilya Somin, Federalism and Tort Reform, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 13, 
2011), http://www.volokh.com/2011/02/13/federalism-and-tort-reform-3/ (discussing state 
tort reform laws that have helped alleviate this problem); Cf. Michael Krauss & Robert 
Levy, Can Tort Reform and Federalism Coexist?, CATO INSTITUTE (Apr. 14, 2004), 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-514es. html (explaining how state-level tort abuses can be 
constrained without wholesale displacement of state common law). 
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centralization clearly occurred, as witness the massive expansion 
of federal spending and regulation permitted by the new Su-
preme Court decisions. But centralized political power could be, 
and often was, used for the benefit of state governments and lo-
cal interest groups, rather than to promote a systematic plan of 
economic regulation designed in Washington. Centralized power 
need not be wielded for the benefit of the center itself. 
Greve also provides a long and detailed discussion of the 
post-New Deal period. During this era, in his view, the anticom-
petitive tendencies first established in the New Deal era have 
deepened (chs. 12-16). He faults the modern Supreme Court for 
doing little or nothing to curb the excesses that began in the 
1930s (ch. 16). He is also very critical of the “federalism revival” 
that began in the Rehnquist Court in the 1990s, which he sees as 
conflating the interests of state governments with those of fede-
ralism. “The notion that there might be a difference between 
constitutional federalism and state demands . . . never enters the 
picture” (p. 262). 
On this last point, Greve is somewhat unfair to the justices. 
In the important 1992 case of New York v. United States, Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion clearly emphasizes that “[s]tate of-
ficials cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Con-
gress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution . . . In-
deed, . . . powerful incentives might lead both federal and state 
officials to view departures from the federal structure to be in 
their personal interests.”26 Constitutional federalism, she wrote, 
exists for the benefit of “the people,” not the states alone.27 More 
recently, in Bond v. United States (2011), Justice Kennedy wrote 
an opinion for a unanimous Court which held that “States are 
not the sole intended beneficiaries of federalism,” because 
“[f]ederalism secures the freedom of the individual,” as well as 
the prerogatives of state governments.28 
The justices clearly do recognize the “difference between 
constitutional federalism and state demands” (p. 262). But it is 
fair to add that this recognition only rarely affects the results of 
important federalism cases.29 Elsewhere, I have argued that it is 
 
 26. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992). 
 27. Id. at 182–83. 
 28. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011). It is fair to note that this 
decision, which came down in June 2011, may have been decided too late to be consi-
dered by Greve in his book. 
 29. New York v. United States remains the only decision of the “federalist revival” 
that struck down a law on federalism grounds despite the likely prior consent of the state 
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at odds with the Court’s willingness to license almost any grants 
to state governments so long as the states have consented to 
them.30 
Greve’s assessment of the situation is not completely nega-
tive. He argues that the United States still has a more competi-
tive federal system than most other nations, and hopes that 
competition-promoting reforms might arise under the combined 
impact of a severe fiscal crisis and a revival of constitutional ori-
ginalism (pp. 381–95). The former, he believes, has rendered the 
current system unsustainable, while the latter provides a poten-
tial way out of our present crisis. (pp. 394–96). The federal gov-
ernment can no longer afford to lavishly subsidize states. Thus, 
they may be forced to compete with each other in order to ob-
tain new fiscal resources, as happened in some other federal sys-
tems that have gone through similar “acute crisis” (pp. 380–83). 
Originalism, Greve hopes, might help us find a way out of our 
crisis by reinvigorating judicial enforcement of constitutional 
rules restricting anticompetitive state policies (pp. 385–96). But 
he also recognizes that the future of American federalism might 
be continued decline or even collapse (pp. 381, 389). 
 II. WHY COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM REQUIRES 
LIMITS ON FEDERAL POWER 
Greve’s often compelling analysis of the Constitution as a 
system for facilitating competitive federalism suffers from a po-
tential internal contradiction. On the one hand, Greve recogniz-
es that state governments dislike competition and will lobby 
Congress for measures facilitating the establishment of a cartel 
(pp. 8–9, 206–08). He is pessimistic about the prospects for con-
gressional resistance to such pressures. As discussed above, he 
argues that much of the post-New Deal transformation of fede-
ralism can be explained as a process of federally-enforced cartel 
formation.31 
Yet Greve also defends a nearly unconstrained interpreta-
tion of Congress’ powers to regulate under the Commerce 
Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause, and spend money un-
 
involved. New York, 505 U.S. at 182–86. But it is worth noting that the Court invalidated 
the provision of the Violence against Women Act challenged in United States v. Morrison 
despite the fact that 36 states filed an amicus brief urging it to uphold the law, while only 
one state, Alabama, argued the other way. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 4, at 114. 
 30. See Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism, supra note 4, at 495–96. 
 31. See Part I of this review.  
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der the Spending Clause (pp. 162–65, 257–58, 343–46). This in-
terpretation leads him into a potential cul de sac: the competitive 
federalism he seeks to promote by imposing restrictions on state 
behavior could easily be undermined by state-supported federal 
legislation. 
As to the Commerce Clause, Greve endorses the outcome, 
though not all of the reasoning of the Court’s decision in Wick-
ard v. Filburn (pp. 343–46),32 a crucial 1942 case which ruled that 
the Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to limit farmers’ 
growth of wheat on their own property even in cases where the 
wheat in question had never crossed state lines or been sold in 
any market. Greve concludes that Wickard was correct because 
Congress has the authority to “limit the interstate supply” of any 
commodity, and presumably to take any measures that might fa-
cilitate that end (p. 345). In his view, the power upheld in Wick-
ard may not be justifiable under the Commerce Clause alone, 
but is permitted by a combination of that Clause and the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause (pp. 344–45). 
Greve does not endorse completely unlimited congressional 
regulatory authority. He supports the Court’s decisions in United 
States v. Lopez33 and United States v. Morrison,34 which ruled that 
Congress lacked the power to ban gun possession in school zones 
and gender-motivated acts of violence (pp. 345–46). Perhaps 
more surprisingly, he also argues that the Obama health care 
plan individual health insurance mandate recently upheld by the 
Supreme Court,35 is unconstitutional, because it is not “proper” 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause (p. 346).36 
It is not entirely clear why Greve’s argument does not re-
quire him to reject Lopez and Morrison, as well as endorse 
Wickard. As the dissenters in the former two cases pointed out, 
banning guns in school zones and restricting gender-based vi-
olence could well facilitate the regulation of commerce in guns in 
 
 32. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 33. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 34. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 35. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 36. I authored an amicus brief in the individual mandate case that advanced a simi-
lar position. See Brief for Washington Legal Foundation and Constitutional Law Scho-
lars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Dep’t of Health and Human Serv. v. Fla. 
(No. 11-398), available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/litigation/briefs/11-
398bsacWashingtonLegalFoundation.pdf. For a good statement of the case that the re-
quirement of propriety is intended to protect state autonomy against federal infringe-
ment, including by laws that are “necessary,” see Gary Lawson & Patricia Granger, The 
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 
43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). 
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the former case and promote various types of commerce by mak-
ing it easier for women to travel in the latter.37 Regardless, Wick-
ard alone is enough to authorize most federally-sponsored car-
tels of the type that rightly worry Greve. Any effort to restrict 
competition between state governments for businesses or tax-
payers can easily be portrayed as an attempt to “limit the inter-
state supply” of a commodity, or conversely, expand it. 
Greve worries that a narrow interpretation of the Congress’ 
affirmative powers under the Commerce Clause would lead to a 
narrow interpretation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, which 
in turn would make it impossible for the courts to constrain 
“protectionist and exploitative” state legislation targeting inter-
state commercial enterprises (pp. 343–44). This concern is not 
entirely without merit, but it is overstated. Even the narrowest 
originalist interpretation of the Commerce Clause as only cover-
ing interstate trade in goods and services is still sufficient to 
create a parallel Dormant Commerce Clause that combats many 
state protectionist measures.38 State law excluding out-of-state 
producers or discriminating against them in favor of in-staters 
would fall. 
Such a narrow definition of the Commerce Clause might not 
allow the Dormant Commerce Clause to be used to combat all 
possible state efforts to exploit interstate commerce, such as ab-
usive tort suits that mostly target out-of-state producers. But 
many such efforts might be constrained by the very interstate 
competition that Greve seeks to invigorate. Businesses will not 
want to operate in states with abusive laws, or at least not as 
much as in rival states with a better business climate.39 
Some abusive state legislation could also be blocked by 
reinvigorating constitutional protection for property rights and 
economic liberties. Stronger enforcement of the Public Use 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment could curtail state and local ef-
forts to transfer property away from politically weak interest 
groups to powerful ones.40 Similarly, a partial reversal of the 
modern doctrine of extreme deference to state economic legisla-
 
 37. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (detailing various poten-
tial effects of gun possession in school zones on interstate commerce); Morrison, 529 U.S. 
at 614 (noting that Congress had compiled extensive evidence of the impact of gender-
based violence on commerce). 
 38. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1 (2001) (defending this view of the original meaning). 
 39. See the discussion of tort reform in Part I above. 
 40. See Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Tak-
ings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183 (2007). 
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tion41 could make it more difficult for state governments to use 
economic regulation to benefit in-state interest groups at the ex-
pense of outsiders. Such judicial protection for economic liberty 
has substantial justification on originalist grounds, as it would 
reinvigorate the nineteenth century constitutional doctrine dis-
favoring “class legislation” that seeks to benefit one interest 
group at the expense of another or that of the general public.42 
Increased judicial protection for property rights can also 
help alleviate exploitative state behavior targeting immobile re-
sources, such as property in land, which Greve recognizes com-
petitive federalism is unlikely to alleviate (p. 338).43 Judicial en-
forcement of protection for property rights and economic 
liberties could combat state predation on interstate businesses at 
least as effectively as an expansive Dormant Commerce Clause, 
and without simultaneously licensing an expansive affirmative 
Commerce Clause power that can be used to impose the same 
sorts of exploitative and anti-competitive regulations nation-
wide. The latter is a crucial point. However harmful one or even 
several states’ predatory regulations might be, they are less so 
than a similar law imposed nationwide by Congress. 
Obviously, the Supreme Court is unlikely to reinvigorate 
judicial protection for economic liberties in the near future. But 
it is also unlikely to embrace Greve’s expansive vision of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.44 Progress on either front is likely 
to be slow and incremental, at best. The prospects for property 
rights are somewhat better, since such efforts were only narrowly 
defeated in several key decisions over the last decade, most not-
ably Kelo v. City of New London.45 
 
 41. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (holding that the Courts 
must uphold any economic regulation that is “rationally” related to some conceivable 
“legitimate state interest,” even if it was not one actually envisioned by the legislature 
that adopted the law). 
 42. For recent works outlining the originalist case for judicial protection of econom-
ic liberties under the Fourteenth Amendment, see.e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, 
REHABILITATING LOCHNER (2011); DAVID A. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: 
REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (2011); TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE 
RIGHT TO EARN AN HONEST LIVING (2010). See also BERNARD SIEGAN, ECONOMIC 
LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980). 
 43. I discuss why interjurisdictional competition is unlikely to provide effective pro-
tection for immobile assets in Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. CHI. 
LEGAL FORUM 53 (2011). 
 44. Greve himself stresses the Court’s relative timidity in this area in recent years, 
as some justices seek to roll back the doctrine rather than expand it (pp. 321–24). 
 45. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For a review of the relevant recent case law on constitu-
tional property rights, see Ilya Somin, Taking Property Rights Seriously: The Supreme 
Court and the “Poor Relation” of Constitutional Law (George Mason Law & Economics 
!!!SOMIN-282-TURNINGFEDERALISMRIGHTSIDEUP.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2012 1:33 PM 
318 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 28:303 
 
Similar criticisms can be raised against Greve’s acceptance 
of the broad interpretation of the Spending Clause (pp. 248–57). 
If that Clause, which gives Congress the power to spend money 
to “pay the debts and provide for the common Defence and 
General Welfare of the United States” gives the federal gov-
ernment virtually unlimited discretion to spend money for what-
ever purposes it wants, then it can use that authority to curtail 
interstate competition and promote cartels. States that refuse to 
take part in a cartel or obey federal mandates can be denied cru-
cial funds and placed at a disadvantage relative to their competi-
tors.46 For this reason, Greve notes, “[s]tate acceptance of federal 
bargains—even on very onerous conditions—is typically a fore-
gone conclusion” (p. 258). Moreover, as he goes on to point out, 
states will often lobby for conditional grants that give them 
money and prevent their competitors from undercutting them 
(pp. 251–53). Finally, conditional federal grants restrict policy 
diversity between states, which in turn diminishes the range of 
issues on which states can compete with each other.47 
Greve correctly points out that the anticompetitive effects 
of constitutionally unconstrained federal spending are limited by 
the federal government’s fiscal capacities (pp. 257, 280). But this 
is a relatively weak constraint, given the federal government’s 
enormous resources, including the ability to pile up a massive 
national debt. Greve himself believes that we cannot rely on 
congressional self-restraint to restrain grants to state govern-
ments short of a fiscal crisis (pp. 250–58, 278–80). If this is cor-
rect, he may want to give constitutional constraints on the scope 
of federal spending a second look. 
Even if constitutional constraints on the scope of federal 
power are necessary to make competitive federalism effective, 
they may not be enforceable. Greve argues that they are ulti-
mately ineffective “parchment” barriers (pp. 162–65, 343–44), 
because courts cannot enforce them against resistance by the po-
litical branches of government. 
It is certainly true that courts cannot enforce strict limits on 
federal power without at least some substantial external political 
support. Federal judges will not long remain radically at odds 
with dominant public opinion, at least not on major issues.48 But 
 
Research Paper No. 08-53, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1247854. 
 46. See Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism, supra note 4. Greve re-
cognizes this dynamic (pp. 250–53).  
 47. Id. at 468–70. 
 48. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009) (providing 
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the Supreme Court was able to generate sufficient political sup-
port to enforce substantial limits on Congress’ enumerated pow-
ers throughout much of the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies.49 Obviously, such enforcement has been much rarer since 
the New Deal constitutional revolution. But its revival is far 
from a hopeless cause. As I write these words, the Court has just 
recently nearly invalidated President Obama’s health reform 
law, one of the most important federal regulatory statutes of the 
last several decades,50 and imposed significant constraints on 
Congress’ power to “coerce” state governments by attaching 
conditions to federal grants.51 
Promoting stricter judicial enforcement of limits on federal 
power is far from an easy task. But it is not clear that it is neces-
sarily more difficult than Greve’s program of enforcing strict 
limits on anticompetitive behavior by state governments, espe-
cially when the latter is supported by Congress, as Greve recog-
nizes it often is. 
Ultimately, Greve’s embrace of extremely broad congres-
sional authority to regulate and spend is at odds with his defense 
of competition as the organizing principle of American federal-
ism. The way out of this dilemma would be for Greve to endorse 
more limited interpretations of the Commerce, Spending, and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses. Doing so could well be consistent 
with his seeming commitment to originalism. Modern scholar-
ship has unearthed extensive evidence suggesting that post-New 
Deal decisions have expanded congressional power far beyond 
the original meaning of these three clauses.52 
 
evidence on this point from many stages of American history). 
 49. This notion was reflected in cases such as E.C. Knight Co. v. United States, 156 
U.S. 1 (1895) (striking down application of major federal antitrust law, and holding that 
Congress lacked the power to regulate “manufacturing” under the Commerce Clause). 
 50. See National Federation of Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2538–2600 
(upholding the individual by a narrow 5-4 margin, while rejecting the federal govern-
ment’s argument that its crucial mandate to purchase health insurance was authorized by 
the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses). 
 51. See id at 2601–08. 
 52. On Greve’s embrace of originalism, see Part III. For originalist arguments for a 
limited interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, 
The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183 
(2003); and Lawson & Granger, supra note 36. For similar arguments regarding the 
Spending Clause and the Commerce Clause, see, e.g., Barnett, The Original Meaning of 
the Commerce Clause, supra note 38; John Eastman, The Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. 
REV. 1 (2001) (defending a narrow originalist interpretation of the Spending Clause); 
Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism, supra note 4, at 489–94 (same). Ob-
viously, some scholars argue that originalism requires a broader interpretation of these 
clauses. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 
(2005) (defending a broad interpretation of all three); Jack Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. 
!!!SOMIN-282-TURNINGFEDERALISMRIGHTSIDEUP.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2012 1:33 PM 
320 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 28:303 
 
In this review, I do not attempt to prove that the more re-
strictive interpretations of original meaning are necessarily 
right.53 Still less do I advance anything approaching a compre-
hensive case for stronger judicial protection for property rights 
and economic liberties.54 But I do suggest that the more restric-
tive interpretations of congressional power are a better fit with 
Greve’s theory of competitive federalism than their broader ri-
vals. If it turns out that the broad view is the correct interpreta-
tion of the original meaning, that would be an indication that 
competitive federalism and originalism are much more at odds 
than Greve assumes. 
III. COMPETITION AND ORIGINALISM 
There is an interesting potential tension between The Upside-
Down Constitution’s advocacy of competition as the central or-
ganizing principle of constitutional federalism and the author’s 
recognition that this ideal was barely even mentioned by the 
Founding Fathers, much less regarded as fundamental. As Greve 
recognizes, the idea of competitive federalism “does not appear 
in the Federalist or in any other, lesser writings of the Founding 
era” (p. 56). He further notes that James Madison ignored the 
important structural implications of mobility between state gov-
ernments (p. 59). As a result, the “Father of the Constitution” 
was apparently oblivious to the major vehicle of beneficial com-
petition between state governments. It is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to understand the case for interstate competition without in-
cluding the crucial role of mobility in the analysis. 
The absence of competition from the vision of the Founders 
need not be problematic from Greve’s point of view if he were to 
defend competitive federalism as a “living constitution” theory 
of interpretation.55 But Greve instead insists that it is justified on 
the basis of originalism (ch. 3, pp. 394–96). He pins his hopes for 
the restoration of a competitive system on the rise of originalism 
“as a political force” (p. 395), albeit one that rejects “rigid 
 
L. REV. 1, 15–30 (2010) (arguing for a broad originalist interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause). 
 53. I have offered such an argument in the case of the Spending Clause. See Somin, 
Closing the Pandora’s Box, supra note 4, at 489–94. 
 54. I do develop some elements of such a case in respect to property rights in Somin, 
Controlling the Grasping Hand, supra note 40, and Somin, Taking Property Rights Se-
riously, supra note 45. 
 55. For a recent defense of this school of thought, see DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE 
LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
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clause-boundedness” in favor of a broader unified perspective 
on the Constitution (p. 393). 
The fact that the Founders ignored the idea of interstate 
competition in their writings does not necessarily mean that 
Greve’s theory of competitive federalism and originalism are in-
compatible. One possible way to reconcile the two is to shift the 
focus from original intent—the plans of the Framers of the Con-
stitution—to original meaning: what the Constitution was un-
derstood to mean by the general public at the time. Original 
meaning has become the dominant school of originalist constitu-
tional theory over the last two decades.56 Unfortunately, it is un-
likely that the general public at the time of the founding had any 
greater understanding of competitive federalism than did the 
Framers. Indeed, they may have had less, given that the public is 
less likely to be aware of sophisticated theories of constitutional 
structure than are political elites.57 
But even if neither the Framers nor the public interpreted 
the Constitution as establishing a system of competitive federal-
ism, that need not be a death blow for Greve’s theory. Although 
the Framers and the public may not have had any understanding 
of competitive federalism as a general theory, it is possible that 
they nonetheless sought to establish a Constitution that would 
constrain the kinds of state government abuses that competitive 
federalism aims to eliminate and do so in the way Greve recom-
mends. As Greve explains in the first part of his book (chs. 2–3), 
the Framers did repeatedly emphasize the need to break down 
state trade barriers and eliminate state legislation that preyed on 
interstate commerce as among the major reasons for establishing 
the Constitution. It is possible that they arrived at a theory of 
constitutional federalism without using the name. Perhaps like 
the proverbial man who never he knew was writing in prose, the 
Founders were organizing a regime of competitive federalism 
without knowing it. 
 
 56. See James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Tex-
tualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1524, 1526 (2011) (arguing that it is the newly dominant school of 
thought in constitutional theory). For leading works advocating original meaning origi-
nalism, see, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); KEITH 
E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The 
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000). I have catalogued several dif-
ferent versions of original meaning theory in Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political Ignor-
ance, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2015006. 
 57. For the implications of widespread, often rational, political ignorance for origi-
nal meaning originalism, see Somin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, supra note 56. 
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In this respect, Greve’s theory is similar to another influen-
tial recent work advocating an interpretation of constitutional 
federalism based on modern economic theory: Robert Cooter 
and Neil Siegel’s “collective action federalism.”58 Cooter and 
Siegel argue that Congress’ enumerated powers in Article I of 
the Constitution should be interpreted as giving the federal gov-
ernment the power to solve collective action problems that arise 
between the states, while leaving most other policy questions to 
the discretion of the latter.59 Although Cooter and Siegel recog-
nize that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution did not 
understand modern collective action theory,60 they argue that the 
Founders intuitively “knew a collective action problem when 
they saw one” and claim that such an intuitive understanding is a 
unifying theme underpinning their rationales for most of the 
specific provisions of Article I.61 Similarly, Greve can be inter-
preted as arguing that the Founders intuitively grasped the need 
to promote competitive federalism, even though they may not 
have understood the idea as a systematic social scientific theory. 
It is even possible that Cooter and Siegel’s collective action 
federalism and Greve’s competitive federalism could be com-
bined in one single overarching theory. Cooter and Siegel’s 
framework might explain what powers are granted to the federal 
government, while Greve’s approach accounts for the need to 
impose constraints on predatory behavior by the states, and ex-
plains why a substantial realm of autonomy should be left to 
them, in order to give them control over policy areas on which 
they could compete. 
I do not mean to suggest that either Cooter and Siegel’s 
theory or Greve’s are flawless. Elsewhere, I have outlined sever-
al concerns about Cooter and Siegel’s approach.62 I also have my 
disagreements with Greve.63 Interestingly, both err in underrat-
ing the need for judicial enforcement of constitutional limits on 
 
 58. Robert Cooter & Neil Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory 
of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010). 
 59. Id. at 117–20. 
 60. See id. at 117 (noting that “[t]he Framers lacked the tools and language of mod-
ern social science”). Modern collective action theory was not developed until the 1950s 
and 1960s. For crucial early works, see, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY 
OF DEMOCRACY (1957); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); 
Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 
(1954). 
 61. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 58, at 117, 121–26. 
 62. See Ilya Somin, Federalism and Collective Action, JOTWELL (June 20, 2011), 
http://conlaw.jotwell.com/federalism-and-collective-action/. 
 63. See Part II above. 
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federal power to make their theories work.64 And probably nei-
ther would welcome a proposal to combine the two theories, at 
least not without significant reservations. Nonetheless, there are 
important similarities between the two. Both take a similar ap-
proach to originalism, and both seek to use modern political 
economy to develop a theory of constitutional federalism. 
Greve’s competitive federalism is potentially reconcilable 
with originalism. But more work will need to be done to estab-
lish the degree of synergy between them. 
CONCLUSION 
The competitive federalism paradigm advanced by Greve is 
an impressive contribution to constitutional theory. More than 
any previous scholar, Greve has shown how it is possible to un-
derstand the Constitution as a whole as a structure for promot-
ing competition between state governments. 
Greve’s work will not be the last word in the debate over 
federalism. It is open to criticism from both those who reject the 
competitive approach entirely,65 and those like myself who disag-
ree with Greve over some of its implications.66 Nonetheless, The 
Upside-Down Constitution is a path-breaking work. In time, it 
might even help show the way to a better future in which Ameri-
can federalism is turned right-side up. 
 
 64. Part II discusses this flaw in Greve’s theory. See also Somin, Federalism and 
Collective Action, supra note 62 (explaining why Cooter and Siegel’s theory requires 
stricter limits on federal power in order to prevent the federal government from creating 
collective action problems, as well as solving them). 
 65. For a recent statement of a view of federalism almost diametrically opposed to 
Greve’s, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY (2008). 
 66. Part II of this review discusses this disagreement. 
